If Donald Trump meets Kim Jong Un this year, what are the likely implications for US-North Korea relations and regional

Trump has said he plans to meet Kim Jong Un later in 2026 [19][20][21], and both leaders have signaled openness to a meeting [30]. That would be a revival of the personal diplomacy that marked their first term, but past summits did not end North Korea's nuclear program [20][23]. Here is what experts say the likely effects could be.

What a meeting would probably look like

• A renewed summit would probably be more about atmosphere than details. It would likely reaffirm the basic ideas of the 2018 Singapore Declaration instead of negotiating denuclearization line by line [2].
• The leaders would likely avoid detailed denuclearization talks and leave the hard work to their teams [3].
• Kim would probably push topics that appeal to Trump, such as peace treaties, ending U.S. military exercises, and ending what North Korea calls hostile relations [4].
• North Korea has said it will not talk unless the U.S. drops its focus on denuclearization and accepts the reality of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state [18][38][66][67].

How it could change US–North Korea relations

• Even modest outcomes could matter because North Korea's long-term goal is to achieve de facto U.S. acceptance as a nuclear weapons state [5].
• The incentive picture has changed. Sanctions relief matters less to Pyongyang now because Russia has weakened UN sanctions [6], and North Korea is less motivated to engage Washington after strengthening ties with Moscow and Beijing [33][34].
• Without real policy shifts, North Korea is likely to remain hostile and keep expanding its nuclear forces [16]. Sustained diplomacy is unlikely because the two sides have incompatible preconditions for talks, and major policy shifts on both sides are unlikely [51][56].
• Past experience is sobering. The 2018 summit produced a vague pledge on denuclearization and peace, the 2019 Hanoi summit collapsed over sanctions relief and denuclearization, and North Korea continued its programs afterward [115][150][151][116].
• A summit could also put the U.S. on a path toward treating North Korea as a permanent nuclear state, which would be a major change in U.S. policy [40]. Any shift this big would need consultation with South Korea and Japan, whose key concern is abandonment of denuclearization and implicit recognition of North Korea's nuclear status [13].

What it could mean for Northeast Asian security

• A meeting could help restart dialogue, pause North Korea's weapons expansion, and improve inter-Korean relations, but Kim might meet Trump and then keep proliferating anyway [41]. Without dialogue, North Korea's weapons capabilities will almost certainly keep growing [42].
• Allies worry about being sidelined. North Korea's goal includes dividing U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation [7], and a revisionist North Korea would likely bypass Seoul rather than pursue peaceful coexistence with South Korea [8].
• If the summit produces little real security improvement, it could sow division between Washington and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo [40].
• U.S. military posture could shift. After the 2018 summit, Trump halted joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises [106][110]. More recently, the U.S. and South Korea scaled back Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises after Trump ordered a reduction [28]. Experts worry Trump might agree to reduce or end U.S. military commitments to South Korea and Japan in order to claim a win [145]. Japan is especially concerned that a deal could ignore threats North Korea poses to U.S. allies [147].
• North Korea's nuclear reach makes allied reassurance fragile. Its ability to strike the U.S. mainland raises fears that Washington might hesitate to defend South Korea and Japan in a crisis [79]. The U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance already faces weak nuclear reassurance and strained trilateral cohesion [80].
• China and Russia matter too. China could support renewed Trump-Kim diplomacy to hedge against Trump and dilute Russian influence over North Korea [9], and Beijing and Moscow have become more permissive of North Korea's nuclear program [35]. Engagement could try to limit deeper Russia-North Korea cooperation, but that alliance will likely remain [15].
• Northeast Asia lacks a regional mechanism to manage the growing insecurity and instability [74].

Bottom line

The most likely outcome, according to one analysis, is flashy headlines and a superficial reduction in tensions without addressing the fundamental issues of denuclearization or peace [10]. Another expert view is that the worst case is a return to threats, while the upside is quite high if things go well [124]. In short, a meeting could open a door, but whether it changes anything depends on hard policy choices that neither side has made yet [51][56].